

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-422

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the DCI for Public Affairs  
FROM: Robert W. Gambino  
Chairman  
SUBJECT: Security Orientation for Senior Officials

The DCI has asked for my views on security orientation for high-level officials and their staffs, particularly those without professional intelligence backgrounds, to enable them better to deal with circumstances such as dealings with the press which bear on sensitive subjects. It would be helpful to me in responding to this to know how other departments and agencies prepare their senior officials and staff on how to field press, public and Congressional inquiries on sensitive subjects. Attached is a suggested memorandum you may wish to use in asking State, Defense, the Military Departments, Justice and the FBI about their approaches to this matter. A response by January 26, 1979 would be appreciated.

Robert W. Gambino

Attachment

SUBJECT: Security Orientation for Senior Officials

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1 - C/SECOM w/att

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Public Affairs Officers:

Department of State  
Department of Defense  
Department of the Army  
Department of the Navy  
Department of the Air Force  
Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Herb Hetu  
Assistant to DCI for Public Affairs

SUBJECT: Security Orientation for Senior Officials

1. In the interests of improving Intelligence Community policy, guidance and assistance on the protection of intelligence information, it would be helpful to know what sort of security orientation senior officials in your departments and agencies are provided on how best to field contacts with the press, public and Congress on sensitive subjects. In addition to your overall comments on your programs, I would appreciate specific responses on the following:

a. What control or cognizance do your offices maintain over such contacts with officials who are not public affairs officers?

b. What security review is made of off-the-cuff responses during such contacts to identify sensitive information that may have been inadvertently disclosed?

What is done in such cases to notify officials or other agencies with primary cognizance over any information so disclosed?

c. What feedback is made within your department and agency to amend the classification status of information which is intentionally disclosed during such contacts by officials with requisite declassification authority?

d. What is done in your department or agency to notify cognizant officials and agencies about uncleared persons who, during such contacts, display detailed familiarity with a matter known to be still classified?

2. Any suggestions you may wish to offer on this subject would be appreciated.

3. It would be helpful to have your replies by January 24, 1979.

Herb Hetu

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5 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Affording Better Protection to our  
Sources and Methods Outside CIA [ ]

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1. Our recent steps to strengthen security have been limited largely to CIA. I am concerned that we should also move to raise security consciousness among those who have access to sensitive intelligence sources and information in the National Security Council, on the Hill, and elsewhere. [ ]

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2. One way of doing this would be to ensure that our security briefings of these officials are thorough, carry a clear message, and are of uniform standard. [ ]

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5. I would appreciate your views on this general subject. Aside from the specific concerns expressed above, it seems to me that we should be thinking in terms of designing an approach to security which is tailored to high-level officials and their staffs--a group which has extremely broad access to sensitive information and regular contacts with the press, yet through inexperience often lacks the instilled security consciousness common to most professionals in intelligence. ☐

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STANSFIELD TURNER

